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Regulating Private Health Insurance in France: New Challenges for Employer-Based 
Complementary Health Insurance 




In France, people obtain basic health insurance coverage through a public health insurance system. 
Although public coverage is comprehensive, substantial co-payments and deductibles are more and 
more required and individuals become increasingly dependant on private complementary health 
insurance, to be better reimbursed.  In the context of strengthened constraints to control public health 
spending, the market for complementary cover is indeed likely to develop.  This expansion has several 
implications for the regulation of private health insurance.  Starting in the early 2000s, public policies 
have emphasized tools that directly motivate employers to provide group-insurance schemes.  These 
include subsidies to employers for offering compulsory, supplementary coverage, and mandating 
social partners to negotiate the implementation of health coverage in every company, whatever its size 
or activity.  Such changes tend, to some extent, to “re-couple” health insurance with companies.  This 




En France, l’assurance maladie de base relève du système public de l’assurance sociale.  En dépit 
d’une couverture qui reste étendue, l’élargissement des co-paiements et des franchises rend nécessaire 
l’accès à une assurance santé complémentaire. Dans un contexte qui voit les contraintes pesant sur les 
dépenses publiques se durcir, le marché pour l’assurance complémentaire est de fait appelé à se 
développer.  Cette tendance n’est pas sans conséquence sur la régulation de l’assurance maladie 
privée.  Au début des années 2000, les autorités publiques se sont dotées d’instruments destinés à 
inciter les employeurs à mettre en place des dispositifs d’assurance de groupe rendus obligatoires pour 
les salariés en même temps qu’elles encourageaient les partenaires sociaux à négocier collectivement 
l’implémentation de couvertures complémentaires dans l’ensemble des entreprises, quels que soient 
leur taille ou secteur d’activité.  Le papier explore ce qui est en jeu dans cette nouvelle forme de 
couplage entre l’assurance santé et l’entreprise. 
 
MOTS CLÉS : Assurance-santé privée, protection sociale complémentaire d’entreprise 
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1 This study is based on a research sponsored by the French Ministry of Health (MiRe).  Earlier versions of this 
article were discussed at the 2008 Conference of Association d’Economie Sociale and at 2009 workshop in 
Paris1University (Seminar TemPs). In its present form it was presented at the SASE’s 21
st annual meeting 
(France, July 2009).  We are grateful to Nicholas Sowels for its precious help in writing this paper in English.  










































This paper deals with complementary health insurance provided to people working in 
companies in France.  Recent trends do show that complementary “private” insurance, 
especially through company schemes, is increasingly taking over from the compulsory 
“public” health insurance, which is a part of France’s Sécurité sociale established in 1945.  
By giving firms and insurers new responsibilities, this process constitutes one of the key 
changes that would shape the future of the French health care financing system towards what, 
at first glance, could appeared to be a market-oriented system.  Nevertheless, the state is not 
without capacity to develop and implement rules and governance mechanisms to ensure that 
private providers act in the public interest.  Therefore marketization hypothesis has to be 
challenged by the analysis of the ways in which privatization appears and how market forces 
are affecting social health insurance.  If several recent studies have explored the public-
private mix and privatization in health care in health insurance (Maarse, 2006; Thomson and 
al., 2003; Tuohy and al., 2004), these issues have not been investigated much in France.
2  The 
purpose of this paper is to fill this gap with the aim to draw on several ways of analyzing the 
employer-based health benefits scheme, starting with a few questions, rather simple, but rich 
enough to capture the complexity of a dynamic process involving many factors that touch on 
the insurance coverage and the consumption of care, as well as the labor market changes and 
the dynamics of wages and its negotiation within companies.  
First, why is the public regulator encouraging private insurance?  In France, the health 
spending has grown extremely rapidly over the last 30 years, with only a few, unsustainable 
periods, of slower growth.  Resources, on the other hand, have experienced the opposite trend.  
As in all Bismarkian systems facing structural high level of unemployment and great 
sensitiveness to the labor cost, France's public health system has experienced difficulty in 
securing its financing. If health spending in France as a share of GDP has not fallen 
significantly, compared to cutbacks elsewhere, important changes have taken place within this 
apparent stability (Palier, 2005b).  The growing recourse to private health insurance, as a way 
for diminishing the pressure on public expenditure is one of these changes.   
Second, what are the regulator's preferences?  Starting in the early 2000s, public 
policies have emphasized tools that directly motivate employers to provide coverage or for 
employees to take it up.  This is a major change because, even if employer-sponsored health 
                                                      
2 Note the notable exception of the IRDES (Institute for Research and Information in Health Economics) surveys 
dedicated to private complementary health insurance, see below.  









































benefits emerged historically in the 19th century, within paternalist companies (Castel, 1996),   
it moved into a relatively limited basket of health services for complementary insurance in 
1945, when the public (social) health insurance system was set up. Thereafter this 
complementary private health insurance evolved separately and autonomously from public 
one and was either provided within firms or for civil servants, or directly purchased by 
individuals.  Recently while social rights within the public health system are being eroded, 
private insurance has been under more public policy intervention.  These include granting 
subsidies to employers to offer compulsory, complementary coverage, and mandating social 
partners to negotiate the implementation of health coverage in each company, whatever its 
size or activity.   In doing so, regulators seem to lean more on the Bismarckian social 
insurance rationale for organizing complementary company-based health insurance, rather 
than on a “pure” private insurance model, without, however, imposing a “employer mandate” 
model, at least until today.  Indeed, unlike social insurance, complementary private health 
insurance remains voluntary for firms, but a large set of incentives tend to push them to 
participate and, no less important, to shape employer-based health benefits in a way consistent 
with basic principles of equity in access and solidarity in financing.  If such a position may 
appear to be, at a macro-level, less costly politically in a time of justifiable concern about the 
privatization of risk protection, it remains to be seen whether a company-based health 
insurance could achieve social goals of access and efficiency.   
This question leads to the third issue, why do companies offer complementary health 
insurance?  To answer, we need to look at what really happens on the ground and to study 
how company practices fit in with the dynamic incentives put forward by the public 
authorities.  It can be shown that while complementary health coverage is indeed strongly 
regulated, much still needs to be decided at the microeconomic level.  The behavior of the 
actors involved takes place within a wide range of decision-making parameters, which 
conditions employees’ rights, the level of coverage and the share of the burden the employers 
and employees carry.  These issues are not without consequences for the heterogeneity of 
situations experienced by employees within firm-based social protection.  Given these 
circumstances, a series of questions stress the paradoxical nature of a policy whereby public 
decision-makers are bestowing a social security mission on today’s private sector.  At the 
most general level, it must be asked whether such measures can really be viable within the 
company sector, given the pressure on wage costs stemming from global competition.  It is 
surely paradoxical to expect a high level of complementary, company health insurance at the 









































same time as the risks bearing down on companies and employment are clearly not without 
consequences for employees and their status with respect to social insurance coverage.  More 
significantly, can private coverage really spread within the small- and medium-sized company 
sector?  Is a new social compromise being nurtured at the microeconomic level within 
companies which will act as a substitute to the weakened, macro-social post-war 
compromise?   
The article is organized as follows.  The section 1 develops the institutional and 
quantitative explorations that exhibit some initial evidence on the growing role of private 
health insurance in the scope of French risk protection.  In the section 2, analysis of the very 
nature of the recent employer-based health insurance policy is provided, which highlights its 
“two-face” design: policies are encouraging private benefits within the confines of social 
insurance but potentially allow considerable discretion on the part of private actors.  We then 
can attempt in section 3 to understand the factors shaping companies social preferences, using 
some empirical studies that have portrayed employers as health benefits providers.  The final 
section concludes with a synthesis of our analysis and a discussion of the future of private 
health insurance in France. 
 
1.  THE BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FINANCE FOR HEALTH CARE  
Following J. Schreyögg and al. (2005), the coverage of a given population for health care 
can be characterized in three dimensions: breadth, depth and height.  While “breadth” can be 
designed as the extent of covered population and “depth” as the range of goods and services 
covered, “height” specifies the extent to which costs of the defined goods and services are 
covered by pre-paid financial resources as opposed to cost-sharing requirements.  This 
conceptual framework is useful to interpret the global trends in health care expenditures for 
France.  
Trends in health expenditures 
Since 1945, French governments have shaped the original Bismarckian Social Health 
Insurance (SHI) scheme towards the provision of universal and mandatory insurance for health 
care (Palier, 2005a).  Initially designed for protecting workers and their families only, the SHI 
progressively extended to all categories of people.   At the same time, the compulsory health 
insurance covered a broader range of benefits (i.e. reimbursing numerous health services and 
medical devices).  Due to the combined effects of “breadth” and “depth”, social health insurance 









































contribution to health spending has been steadily growing over the period 1950-1980.  Running 
at only about 50% between 1950 and 1960, the average level of mandatory health insurance rose 
by 30 percentage points by the early 1980s, to reach 80%.  From 1980 until today, its share in 
total expenditures has fallen, stabilizing on average at around 77% after 1995.  The consequence 
is that, during this period, a growing proportion of the overall health spending shifted over to 
private health insurance and out-of-pocket payments whose cumulative share increased from 
17% in 1980 to 20% in 1995.  Since 1995, as it is shown in table 1, the increase of the non-
publicly spending is only attributable to private health insurance because the share of the out-of-
pocket decreased.  In 2007, French households pay only 8.5% of total health expenditures versus 
9.5% ten years before, while the private health insurers share increased from 12.2 to 13.6% of 
total health expenditures.  During this period it should be noticed that the process of 
generalization continued while the health benefits basket remains comprehensive.  The 
decreasing percentage observed from 1980 to 1995 and after is thus due to the transformations of 
the third dimension evocated, i.e. the “height” of the population coverage, whose features are 
strongly challenged by the cost-containment policies.   
 
Table 1: Main sources of finance (percentage of total expenditure on health care) 
  
Financing  organisations    1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Public Health Insurance  54,9 72,8 80,0 77,4 77,1 77,1 77,1 76,8 76,6 
State  9,5 5,7 3,1 1,1 1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4 1,4 
Private Health Insurance  nd  nd  nd  nd  12,2 12,8 13,3 13,4 13,6 
■ Mutual funds  (non for profit)   5,4 4,7 5,3 6,4 7,3 7,7 7,7 7,8 7,9 
■ Co-managed  Institutions (non 
for profit)              3,3 2,7 3,1 3,2 3,2 
■ For profit Insurance 
companies  30,2 16,9 11,7 15,0  1,6 2,4 2,5 2,4  2,5 
Out-of-pocket              9,6  9,0  8,4  8,4  8,5 
Sources: National Health Accounts (Ministry of Health)  
Notes: Before 1995, National Health accounts did not clearly separate out-of pocket expenses and 
complementary insurance. 
 
Cost sharing in the French health system 
Social health insurance in France covers a wide range of medical goods and services,   
yet patients shoulder a share of costs, which may be more or less significant.  Cost-sharing can 
usually take three forms: co-payment (the user pays a fixed fee or flat rate per item or service), 
co-insurance, known as the ticket modérateur (the user pays a fixed proportion of the total price, 
with the insurer paying the remaining proportion) and deductible (the user bears a fixed quantity 
of the prices, with any excess borne by the insurer) (Thomson and al. 2003).  Unlike co-
insurance and co-payments, the latter has never played a significant role in the French Social 









































Health Insurance system until now.  Reference tariff (so-called tarif de responsabilité) is an 
indirect form of cost-sharing too.  It refers to any rule used by the insurer that sets the basis for 
reimbursement: payment rates set by the SHI’s authorities may be less than what patients pay, 
the difference being paid out-of-pocket.   
The argument in favor cost sharing is twofold.  On one hand, it can be argued that it 
constitutes a good incentive to improve the efficiency of the health care system.  The arguments 
stem from the issue of moral hazard that refers to misuses of health services when the 
individuals do not bear the full cost of their decisions.  On another hand, cost sharing is seen 
as a political lever to sustain or to expand the provision of health care under resources 
constraints.  In fact, both arguments are linked, because the efficiency gains at the micro-level 
serve the macro-level (Thomson and al., op. cit).  More specifically, cost-sharing functions 
may vary along time depending on the specific interactions between private insurance and 
publicly funded system.  
Cost sharing has a long tradition within the French health care system.  In the form of 
a 20% co-insurance for ambulatory care, it was put in place into the SHI original legislation 
from 1945.  Note that the principle of a partial insurance coverage was introduced former in 
1930 with the preparation of Social Insurance Acts.  Unlike their predecessors, the 1945 
legislators introduced the re-insurance of the co-insurance.  Therefore, in contrast to private 
arrangements where Private Health Insurance may play a supplementary or substitutive role, 
PHI in France by the start of Sécurité Sociale  era is clearly a complementary one (OECD, 
2004).  However, during the fifties and sixties, few people accessed complementary coverage.  
Therefore, to avoid that bad health people pay unsustainable health care costs, a co-payment 
exemption was introduced for patients suffering from a serious or a chronic disease (so-called 
“Affections longues et coûteuses”). For those patients the public health insurance paid 100% 
of the health cost when related to the registered disease.   From this date, the share of health 
costs burden between publicly funded systems, patients and private health insurance became a 
major tool for the public authorities regulating the health care expenses. In that matter, there 
is usually a trade-off between fairness and economic constraints.  If the user charges started 
slightly from a low level, various forms of cost sharing got more sophisticated over the years.  
Major reforms of user charges since the mid-1970s 
Since the mid-1970s, when public budgets became under pressure the co-insurance 
rates increased by small increments. Reimbursements have been withdrawn on several 









































occasions, either by not reimbursing new types of goods and services or by increasing the co-
insurance rate.  Furthermore, doctors were allowed to charge more than reimbursed fees to their 
patients who had to pay extra-billing.  During the 1980s co-insurance is thereby more and more 
often combined with co-payment, while reference tariffs become a growing part of cost-
sharing for GP and ambulatory specialist care, as well as for dental care and non-physician 
care.  It resulted in a significant increase of patient charges, only partially covered by 
complementary insurance and thus sustaining an increasing demand for more “private” health 
insurance coverage.
3  
In spite of these cost-containment measures, the gap between resources (never guaranteed 
sustainably) and expenditure (never controlled effectively) widened inexorably throughout the 
1980s, leading to the so-called a wider deficit.  A cost contained plan, called the “Juppé “reform, 
was put forward in 1995 during a particularly difficult economic context, which coincided with 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty.  In contrast to previous money-saving programs that 
were predominantly demand-side oriented, the Juppé Plan is connected in a systemic way around 
main orientations, one of which is the achievement of “universalism” (Barbier and Theret, 2002). 
The idea was to create a universal health insurance regime, encompassing all existing regimes, 
while substituting residence requirements to the work-based conditions for benefit entitlement.  
Due to strong opposition, these elements of the reform, as others, have lasted.  But it led to the 
CMU-universal medical coverage Act (Couverture Maladie Universelle) later passed by 
Parliament in July 1999.  The general design is notwithstanding quite different.  First, instead of 
challenging the fragmentation of the existing system, it entails the creation of a universal 
additional subsidiary regime, for the very few people (0.6%) who were still not covered by the 
public health insurance scheme.  More, it provided a publicly-funded complementary coverage 
for low-income individuals (Grignon et al. 2008).  Several years of spending control and 
increasing out-of-pocket payments, were not actually without consequences to health care access 
for poor persons. In the end of the 1990s, charitable organizations were stressing the extent to 
which certain fringes of the population were no longer getting health care, and the role poor 
                                                      
3 The following are some examples of the extension of cost-sharing in various health care areas (Buchmueller 
and Couffinhal, 2004).  When until 1977, all medicines were covered up to 70%, the Veil reform introduced the 
distinction between drugs considered to be “not substitutable and particularly extensive”, fully reimbursed, and 
dugs “mainly used for the treatment of disorders not usually of a serious nature”, reimbursed at the rate of 40%; 
the co-insurance rate remained at 30% for the other drugs.  Thereafter reimbursement rates were lowered from a 
wide-range of products while others were struck from the list.  Cost-sharing for hospital care was introduced in 
1983 in the form of a per-diem co-payment of € 3 for in-patient stay; since then, nominal amounts have been 
steadily increased to € 8.4 in 1993, €10.7 in 1996.  Dental care and optical care were the areas where SHI 
patients pay the largest share of out-of-pocket expenditures due to the mechanism of reference tariff: for these 
products, prices used to be higher than the official tariff; the patient has to pay an extra-billing, more expensive 
over time.    









































health played in the causes of social exclusion.  By doing so, they brought the issue of the real 
rights to health care onto the political agenda, leading to the CMU-C, universal complementary 
medical coverage (Couverture Maladie Universelle Complémentaire).  Enrollment to this 
complementary insurance program is income related (the monthly income should be lower than 
€ 621).  Approximately 4.5 million individuals are eligible in 2008 to this program. It covers all 
the out-of-pocket payments for a predefined standard basket of health goods and services.   
Resources stem predominantly from a special tax on private health insurance providers (tax rate 
is of 5.9% on complementary insurance contract sales), the traditional links between 
“professional” and national solidarity that characterize a Bismarck type of heath insurance are 
thus strengthened (Barbier and Theret, op. cit.). 
Economic growth again slowed markedly in 2002-2003.  At the same time, social 
spending accelerated, while revenues fell.  Under these straightened economic circumstances, a 
major pension reform was implemented in 2003, which changed profoundly the whole tax 
framework of complementary health insurance provided by companies (see below).  This was 
followed by a further reform of health insurance in 2004, which led to an important institutional 
reform of governance where public mandatory and complementary insurance organizations 
should pilot health insurance together.  More, demand-side control was placed at the center of 
the reform process, opening up means of regulation that broke with the Juppé Plan.  The Act 
began by going back to using co-insurance rates as a policy lever (Palier and Hassenteufel, 
2007).  But one of its cornerstones was the development of a new organization of access to care 
via the creation of a gate keeping from GP to specialists outpatient services. On the basis of this 
legislation, parties involved in health insurance (doctors’ unions, insurance organizations) 
accorded attending physicians a key role in coordinating patients’ medical care.  Under the guise 
of improving the quality of care and promoting the role of general practitioners, this measure 
aims at rationalizing the progress of patients’ treatment within the health care system, thus 
avoiding “nomadic”, costly, behavior by insured consumers which is facilitated by open access.  
Under the 2004’s reform, reimbursement levels vary.  They are higher when patients accept to 
conform to the gate-keeping scheme.  Nevertheless, spending was not still under control.  This is 
the reason why, the last cost-containment measures extended previous policies, seeking once 
again to reduce the share of compulsory health insurance, thanks to the introduction of 
deductible, a form of cost sharing mechanism that have never played a significant role in the 
Social Health Insurance system until now.  As a result, the cost-sharing arrangements show up a 









































very complicated map, where the “scrubland” of reimbursement rules is combined with the 
“scrubland” of reference tariffs. 
Protecting people from user charges 
The final picture that emerges from this overview highlights two main features.  First, as 
observed in other European countries (Maarse, 2006), there are clear indications that cost sharing 
has increased since mid 1980s, following an incremental rather a radical pattern.  Second, as 
shown in table 1 (see above), there is no massive evidence for a crowding-out effect of an 
increase in private health spending on public spending (Tuohy and al., 2004).  This observation 
suggests that the impact of the latter on the public-private mix has been offset by a concomitant 
growth of public health care spending.  An explanation is that there are many exemptions from 
user charges granted for patients of specific population sub-groups.  For example children and 
teenagers up to the age of 16 years are eligible for exemption from deductibles, this is the same 
for women more than 5 months pregnant and newborns in their first 30 days.  Some exemptions 
from user charges are also granted to individuals receiving state benefits (war-invalids and 
disabled) and similar rules are applied to victims of workplace accidents or occupational disease.  
Some 2% of the population is exempted from co-insurance for these reasons.  But above all, the 
main exemptions are related to individuals defined as having poor health, notably chronic or life-
threatening diseases (Affections de longue durée’, see above).  Aging and chronic diseases 
increasing mean that a rising number of patients would benefit from payment exonerations.  
In 2006, roughly 9 millions of individuals were benefiting from these exemptions (13% of the 
whole population); it represents more than 60% of the total public health care spending.
4   
Given all these exemptions mechanisms, the actual medical inflation continue to pull 
the overall public health care spending even if absolute private spending indeed increase 
considerably.  Hence, if the French health care spending features a process of privatization, 
the latter is “creeping” rather than significant.  Notwithstanding, with a picture less global, 
there are indications that some health services are more prone to privatization than the others.  
This is the case in ambulatory and in auxiliary healthcare goods and services, where the 
growth of private spending is concentrated. 
As a result, the start of the new millennium has seen individuals become increasingly 
dependent on complementary coverage, to insure the expanding share of risks which compulsory 
health insurance is covering to an ever-smaller extent.  According to the French health and social 
                                                      
4 The effectiveness and equity of mechanisms for paying for long and expensive care are today being questioned and 
the creation of a health care ceiling (a stop-loss mechanism) is currently being debated. 









































protection survey conducted by IRDES, the proportion of population without complementary 
coverage has fallen since 1996, largely due to the implementation of CMU-C.  The percentage of 
uninsured dropped from 16 percent in 1996 to 7 percent in 2006.  Complementary health 
insurance is most often contracted on an individual basis (for 60% of French people).  A little 
more than one-third of privately insured persons obtained it through an employer, even because 
they work in a company which offers coverage or because they are dependants of workers 
enrolled in a health plan.  Coverage access arrangements exhibit significant variations associated 
with family income; persons most likely to have employer-provided health insurance are those 
who have better revenues (see table 2).   
 
Table 2: Complementary heath insurance access according to the standard living (percentage) 
Standard of living group Individuel CMUC No cover Total
Decile 1 9 33 38 19 100
Decile 2 19 50 17 14 100
Decile 3 23 60 6 11 100
Decile 4 29 60 3 8 100
Decile 5 36 57 2 5 100
Decile 6 38 56 1 5 100
Decile 7 41 54 1 5 100
Decile 8 41 53 1 5 100
Decile 9 42 54 1 4 100
Decile 10 43 53 0 4 100
Total 32 53 7 8 100  
Sources: IRDES/ESPS survey with re-treatments by DREES (Ministry of Health)  
 
Half of the uninsured cite costs as the reason for not purchasing complementary 
insurance.  Indeed, for many years, the purchasers face strong rises in premiums and 
contributions.  The lower is the individuals’ or households’ income, the higher is their 
contribution: it has been estimated that households with the lowest incomes pay out of 10% of 
their earnings on complementary health insurance that is three times more than the households 
with the highest incomes (Kambia-Chopin et al. 2008).   
Nevertheless, the two protective measures which have been adopted continue to play a 
role.  On the one hand, low-income households benefit from free complementary coverage (see 
above).  On the other hand, individuals defined as having poor health are exonerated from paying 
high co-insurance rates.  But this does not provide access to complementary coverage for 
households with low income who may remain without complementary health insurance and 
therefore face significant out-of-pockets expenses for their medical treatments.  This raises the 
growing concern over the question of not only how to lower the number of uninsured persons but 
also how to diminish the burden of complementary insurance premiums for low income 









































categories.  Two steps in that direction were made in 2000; both proposed extending the tax 
incentive for health insurance to encourage insurance purchase.  A first step was the creation of a 
health insurance voucher providing partial rebate on the purchase of a complementary coverage 
for individuals living in households with income just over (15 to 20%) the CMU-C eligibility 
threshold.  The second one advocated an alternative approach: subsidizing employers to 
implement and employees subscribe to employer-provided health insurance plans.  While 
support for individuals is relatively traditional, which does not mean that it is fully effective 
(Grignon and Kambia-Chopin, 2009), selective incentives for companies may address specific 
issues. 
 
2. ACCESS TO COMPLEMENTARY INSURANCE IN COMPANIES: A PARADOXICAL SUBJECT OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 
Implementing a collective complementary health insurance in a firm is a voluntary choice 
resulting from a unilateral decision of the employer, a referendum or a collective agreement 
between the employer and the employees.  The schemes that stems from each of these decision-
making processes can make the coverage optional or compulsory for the employees.  Individuals 
eligible to receive benefits may be either a group of salaries (eventually their dependants) or the 
general population of the firm (eventually the dependants).  The employer financing contribution 
to the insurance premium may be high (90%) or low (0%) and can vary between employees 
categories (for example between executives and non-executives).  Finally, the complementary 
insurance coverage may be parsimonious or more and less generous.  As a result, several types 
of employer-provided health insurance schemes are observed, each with a different impact on 
breadth, depth and height of the medical coverage, as well as on employee's financial effort to 
take-up the employer-sponsored health insurance.  Notwithstanding, until recently each type of 
collective coverage could benefit from tax advantages that didn’t discriminate against different 
contract types.  Reshaping those tax incentives was precisely one of the aims of the 2003 and 
2004 French reforms of pensions and social health insurance that together have worked in favor 
of compulsory forms of complementary health insurance for employees as a result of collective 
bargaining negotiations.  The resulting reform scenario will be examined in details.  
A shift in tax incentives  
Historically, company-related health insurance benefited from tax and social security 
contributions advantages.  The same was true for complementary pensions and for death, 









































invalidity and incapacity insurance which constitutes, with health insurance, the company based 
“welfare plan”.  This system was overhauled by the Fillon Act of 21 August 2003.  Its aim was 
mainly to reform pensions, but the Act also included a set of measures to encourage companies 
to develop all types of complementary insurance contracts that could complement the health 
social insurance benefits. 
 In fiscal terms, the contributions paid by employees into a complementary health scheme 
are tax deductible, up to a certain limit.  Moreover employers’ contributions into schemes are not 
deemed to be equivalent to extra wages, and so are not subject to income tax.  Indeed, 
employers’ financial participation is considered as a part of their business costs and so may be 
deducted from corporation tax, under the same conditions as employee compensation.  Employer 
contributions favoring employees are also excluded from the overall wage bill of each employee 
and so are not subject to normal social security contributions (payroll taxes), within certain 
limits.  The limit to deductibility is fixed on the basis of a composite formula, which in part links 
the size of exonerations to each employee’s wage.  The same holds for the limit on employers’ 
social security exonerations.  Beyond these limits, contributions are reclassified as extra wages, 
and hence included in taxable income and are subject to normal social security contributions.  
So what changed?  In the previous system, contributions to pension schemes, death-
incapacity and invalidity insurance and health insurance were not distinguished.  A generous 
supplementary pension scheme could thus absorb all non-taxable contributions at the expense of 
health or death, incapacity and invalidity insurance (and vice versa).
5  Because they set apart 
supplementary pension on one hand and health, death, incapacity and invalidity insurance on the 
other hand, the new measures allow companies greater room for maneuver in structuring the 
supply of complementary coverage. 
But what of the incentive effects created by the new rules?  Firstly, the changes in the 
limits of exemptions or deductibility have pushed the wage “available” for tax relief towards the 
top of the pay hierarchy.  The new rules thus favor high income earners more, for whom 
companies have greater scope in raising health coverage, compared to the previous system.  It 
must also be noted that tax incentives operate fully for higher incomes, which have higher 
marginal rates and so have a preference for higher insurance coverage.   
These technical changes are not without consequences for the economy as a whole.  They 
also ultimately affect trade-offs made by companies between risks, levels of coverage, financial 
                                                      
5 These contributions are “available” from a social and tax point of view: they correspond to the fraction of the 
wage which can be paid into a complementary scheme, while benefiting from social and tax advantages.   









































burden levels and their distribution between employees and their employers.  But above all that it 
should be noted that new conditions have been introduced that constitute a radical break as they 
have created rights to tax advantages only within the framework of collective, compulsory 
contracts.  In other words, complementary insurance must be mandatory for it to be exempt from 
social security contributions, whereas in the previous regime, the exemption was independent of 
the insurance contract type, which could have been collective, individual, part of a compulsory 
scheme or optional.  Henceforth, all coverage must be collective (i.e. it must benefit to all of a 
company’s personnel or one or several categories of employees defined objectively, in a general 
and impersonal manner) and all the employees are obliged to take it up.  Other conditions of 
eligibility have also been introduced.  Thus, employees must pay significant contributions fixed 
at a uniform rate for all employees belonging to the same, “objective” category (for instance 
executive, non-executive, technicians, blue collars, etc).   
A further new measure introduced later, relative to the 2004 reform concerning social 
health insurance, is that tax and contribution benefits are available only for “responsible” 
contracts.  As stated above, incentives for patients to remain within a gatekeeping system were 
reinforced by the reduction of reimbursements for health care consumed outside this path.  So-
called “responsible” contracts are committed to not reimbursing extra out-of-pocket payments 
when patients visit directly an outpatient specialist.  It is only under “responsible” contracts that 
companies and patients can benefit from all the tax and social contribution advantages of 
complementary health insurance.  Subsequently, such “responsibility” was extended to contracts 
which provide higher reimbursement in areas of preventative medicine. 
Why making complementary insurance compulsory matters to policy maker? 
Three arguments can be made.  The first concerns the presence of externalities, which are 
usually put forward in economic theory.  Individuals undervalue certain goods, whose 
consumption provides positive externalities.  This justifies public intervention, in this case as a 
subsidy for the purchase of private insurance, because the costs incurred by individuals who are 
insured and who receive treatment generate important social benefits.  Compulsion is therefore 
compensated by tax advantages (Summers, 1989).  However, for a country with a generalized 
public health insurance this motive may be much less compelling than the second argument that 
relates to adverse selection.  Complementary health insurance may be subject to self-selection by 
employees on the basis of their idiosyncrasies.   To the degree that young and/or healthy workers 
don’t take-up (or leave) the employer-sponsored coverage, workers enrolling (or remaining) in 
the group system will be comparatively older and unhealthy, which will raise the premiums.  As 









































premiums increase, the youngest and healthiest employees would likely opt-out of the company 
health insurance plan, which will continue to drive up the costs for employer coverage until only 
higher-risk individuals remained in the group, making the health insurance coverage 
unsustainable.  Were the so-called “death-spiral” appears, employers could eventually drop 
coverage.  As a result in order to ensure that low-risk employees take-up or remain in the insured 
group, the company may choose a compulsory scheme, which is, in theory more efficient when 
markets are subject to adverse selection.    
However it could be argued that individuals covered through an employer are less likely 
to be self-selected than those who purchase health insurance by their own (i.e. contract 
individually). The reasons are twofold.  First, due to the fact that the premium is partly 
subsidized by the employer, the insured is less price-sensitive (Ettner, 1997).  Second, there are 
not many high risk profiles in a firm (employees have all working capabilities) and there is 
probably no great heterogeneity in employees’ of the same firm risk profile, so it could be 
supposed that subscription would be exogenous to health status.  Finally, the incentive for 
mandatory employer-sponsored complementary health insurance is more likely to lie in the 
substantial economies of scale permitted by large pooling mechanisms (Gruber and Lettau, 
2004).  Company-related health insurance schemes therefore can provide better guarantees at 
lower costs than individual contracts purchased on the market.   
In addition to the advantages conferred by preferential tax treatment employer-sponsored 
health insurance is also attractive because the compulsory contract favors the implementation of 
a sort of “long-time coverage”, on the condition that costs are acceptable to employees.  The 
cornerstone of such “guaranteed” protection is the Act of December 31, 1989, the so-called Evin 
Act which “reinforces the guarantees provided to insured persons against certain risks”.   
According to the latter, the protection acquired by subscribing a contract with compulsory 
membership is above all a form of protection against risk selection.  The Act thus stipulates that 
when employees are insured collectively and compulsorily, the organization (i.e. the insurer) 
“which provides the guarantees will finance the consequences of illnesses contracted prior to the 
subscription to the membership contract or convention, subject to the usual penalties for persons 
making false statements”.  Legal requirements are comparatively more selective for optional 
collective or individual contracts and the insurer may exclude financial coverage of the 
consequences of certain illnesses. 
The same Act sets out conditions under which collective coverage can be maintained 
individually in certain situations.  The first relates to the termination of work contracts.  Under 









































the Act, an employee who benefits from a compulsory company insurance contract for groups 
covering health care may also receive coverage in case of incapacity, invalidity, unemployment, 
and even early-retirement or retirement.  Insurance freedom to set tariffs for this “after work” 
contract, which has been changed in an individual one, is limited: premiums cannot be up to the 
rates imposed on working employees by more than 50%.  The second situation in which 
guarantees are maintained (whatever the risk covered may be) concerns the termination or non-
renewal of a collective contract with compulsory membership.  The contract must stipulate price 
modalities and conditions under which the insurer can maintain coverage on an individual basis, 
without any trial period or medical questionnaire.  In this case, however, the insurer is free to set 
premiums. 
For contracts with compulsory membership, the right to the continuing of guarantees is 
completed by the right to the continuing of coverage and services.  The Act states that: “when 
insured persons or members are guaranteed collectively against risks, breaches of physical 
integrity, maternity, death or risks of incapacity and invalidity, the termination or non-renewal of 
a contract or convention will not affect the right to immediate or differed insurance payments 
acquired or established during the period of the contract’s validity”.  Insurance payments of all 
types will continue at a level at least equal to that of the last payment due or paid out prior to 
termination or non-renewal.  As a result, the insurer’s commitment must cover at all times, for all 
outstanding contracts and conventions, by providing equivalent assets to those which have been 
supplied during the previous period. 
To sum up, it is undeniable that the Evin Act protects insured persons, especially 
employees who are collectively and compulsorily insured through their company.  Consequently, 
any incentives favoring this contractual arrangement contribute to the extension of protection 
against the excesses of market forces in insurance (adverse selection, termination and/or revision 
of contractual guarantees).   
Taken together, these arguments favor compulsory schemes and legitimate public 
incentives.  But the equation compulsory coverage = tax relief does not exclude adverse effects.  
On one hand, government tax receipts diminish.  One the other hand, exonerations from social 
security contributions sap the resources available for the public health insurance.  While these are 
hard to quantify,
6 the loss of public revenues is not negligible.  Furthermore, the collective costs 
                                                      
6 The tax exclusion is estimated to cost more than €3 billion in foregone state tax revenues in 2006. The losses of 
revenues in Social Security budget related to company-welfare plans are estimated to be around €2 billion 
(Senat, 2008). 
 









































of these measures must also include the indirect effects of moral hazard, which may be more 
widespread with higher complementary insurance.  Despite persistent debates the argument that 
a higher level of health insurance leads to increased consumption of healthcare goods and 
services is generally accepted, as well as the argument that the tax treatment of company health 
benefits, which may induce “over-insurance”, causes inefficiency (Pauly, 2006).  In 2004, the 
authorities therefore dealt with this “anomaly” by making deductibility and exonerations 
conditional to the respect of contract standards, by introducing the notion of “responsible 
contracts”.  The encouragement of collective and compulsory contracts in companies must 
contribute to orienting supply and demand towards good practices, which also support efforts to 
stabilize the finances of compulsory public schemes.  From the policy-makers’ point of view, 
making cost reduction for insurance in companies conditional to the respect of standards meant 
to encourage “tit-for-tat” behaviors, given scarce resources.  At the same time, in political terms, 
favoring compulsory, complementary insurance, which provides benefits to insured employees, 
could make the weakening of the legal and universal public schemes probably less “costly”.   
Encouraging a wide-spread complementary coverage in companies through collective 
bargaining 
Tax and contribution incentives are not the only means used by the public authorities to 
encourage complementary insurance in companies.  Complementary social insurance is also 
traditionally a dimension of collective bargaining within the company.  To make the latter more 
effective, employers not covered are now obliged to include the issue of health insurance within 
annual wage negotiations.  But even if both parties are obliged to dialogue, they do not have to 
reach agreement.  Given this, the public authorities invited the social partners to enter into 
negotiations, within an inter-industry framework, in order to make complementary health 
insurance mandatory in all small and medium-sized companies.  Several economic arguments 
favor collective agreements, with compulsory membership, negotiated at branch level.  First, 
such agreements allow risks to be mutualized among a very large number of employees, which 
small companies cannot do.  Second, they allow more favorable guarantees to be offered at more 
affordable costs.  Third, they harmonize constraints companies face and hence prevent social 
competition from developing between companies operating in the same branch.  However, 
representatives of small and medium-sized companies found these arguments hard to accept, 
given companies’ low “capacity to pay”.  They reacted very cautiously to these political 
initiatives, which in fact have tended to be dissipated within a much wider social policy agenda. 









































That said the mobilization of social partners on the question of a negotiated scenario 
highlights the authorities’ resolution in bringing collective health insurance within the ambit of 
the two key institutions shaping French industrial relations, namely collective bargaining 
agreements and bi-partite cooperation.  Collective accords and conventions are not just favored 
by political decision-makers.  More implicitly, they underline de facto the role of the bi-partite 
model when encouraging compulsory health coverage.  Why?  Three groups of actors share the 
market for complementary health insurance, along demarcation lines set by regulations which 
historically allocated specific activities to insurance companies, mutuelles and bi-partite 
provident institutions.  In accordance with EU Directives, entry barriers between these groups’ 
activities have come down, so that all actors may now operate in all areas of insurance.  As 
institutional partitions disappear, the three groups of actors are increasingly in competition in the 
various market segments, though in reality a certain number of comparative advantages remain.  
Up until 1989, provident institutions had the monopoly of implementing collective agreements 
for complementary health insurance, giving them a privileged position in collective, provident 
insurance, especially when it was compulsory.  Mutuelles, which historically organized their 
activity in the health sector, concentrated more on individual coverage, within companies, on a 
voluntary basis.  Insurance companies faced a specific tax regime concerning health, up until 
2001, and so for very long held a portfolio centered mainly on major risks and pensions.  To be 
sure, mutuelles and insurance companies are redeploying their resources in the collective health 
insurance market.  But the bi-partite provident institutions still hold a number of advantages in 
this area. 
    By  favoring  the  compulsory  model,  and hence the bi-partite model, the public 
authorities are renewing the practice of centralized coordination, which allowed France’s social 
security regime to develop historically.  The sharing out of responsibilities between the state and 
the social partners makes it possible to construct negotiated frameworks within which certain 
principles of solidarity and equity can be put forward and maintained.  From this point of view, 
the transfer of social security functions to companies can draw on the existing organization of 
industrial relations.  It must however be asked whether the reference to the bi-partite model is 
purely rhetorical or actually guarantees employees’ acquired rights.  There is no clear answer to 
this question, especially as the collective negotiating process itself is undergoing profound 
transformation (Traxler, 2003).  In any case, the final outcome remains open, given the third 
characteristic of compulsory social security provided by companies, namely its life-time nature.  









































More generally, and taking into account all the features presented and discussed here, one 
can stress the way in which the varied instruments of public policy are linked together to frame 
and regulate complementary social security within companies.  That said, the changes which 
began in 2000 are characterized less by a diversity in the instruments of public action, than by 
the fact that the authorities have mobilized them simultaneously through the use of targeted 
incentives.  In doing so, the authorities have shown a preference for a model of compulsory, 
complementary insurance, largely mutualized, responsible and standardized, and negotiated with 
social partners.  In the final analysis, this model is close to the “employee insurance” model on 
which France’s Sécurité sociale is based.  However, while the Sécurité sociale was constructed 
on the basis of compulsory insurance outside companies, the new institutions in complementary 
health insurance involve the rationalization of a system of protection within companies.  As a 
result, the expected impact of incentives (i.e. to limit the effects of a weakening of acquired 
social rights in the public insurance system) depends mainly on the willingness and the capacity 
of actors to take part in a process they are not obliged to, and to align themselves on the 
authorities’ “preferred” model.  The economic, social and political factors which interact in this 
issue are complex.  What trade-offs do companies make between concerns over compensation 
and those relating to social insurance that are linked to complementary, collective protection?  
This issue is examined below, more from a prospective point of view rather than as an 
assessment, and it will be asked how company practices fit in with the dynamic incentives put 
forward by the public authorities. 
 
3.  COMPANY RESPONSES TO MANDATED BENEFITS 
At least two questions arise.  First, to what extent will it be possible to encourage 
companies which do not have complementary health schemes to adopt them, and how?  Second, 
how far will it be possible to lead companies that do have an optional scheme to make it 
compulsory and how will they deal with the ensuing constraints?   These two issues will be 
discussed here and then two other questions will be raised rapidly.  One relates to the negotiation 
process and the governance of complementary insurance, the other concerns the life-time 
character of company coverage.  
The decision to establish complementary insurance within companies 
What factors shape the implementation of complementary coverage in companies?   
Traditionally, economists consider in-company health insurance to be a form of compensation.  









































From this point of view, the driving force behind insurance may be found on the demand side 
(Buchmueller, 2000).  If a collective scheme is established by joint agreement between the 
employer and the employees, it is because the latter are willing to accept a lower wage in 
exchange for the advantages of having collective coverage against future, random risks.  If 
employees value company insurance, it is because they believe it to hold a number of advantages 
they appreciate, in terms of lower insurance premiums and tax deductions, if the price elasticity 
of such health insurance is greater than unity.  Employees value these advantages all the more, 
the higher their marginal tax rate.  Economic analysis assumes implicitly that the employer 
decides the degree to which total labor costs can be borne, with there being a trade-off between 
direct and indirect wages.  In the final analysis, in-kind benefits should be offset by lower wages, 
an idea taken up in the modern theory of compensating differentials (Rosen, 1986).  This 
theoretical framework is often used by American economists to analyze health benefits 
economically (Pauly, 1997; Miller, 2005).  No unequivocal empirical proof exists, however, for 
this theoretical argument.  Instead, generous social benefits are often to be found in companies 
where wages are high. 
The fact that trade-offs do not always function clearly supports the hypothesis that 
companies offering social benefits like complementary health care may be using them as a lever 
of human resource management.  A general approach to overall compensation implicitly draws 
on the idea that complementary insurance in fact stems from clearly-understood employer 
interests.  Consultants very often sell the argument that overall compensation improves company 
performance to human resource managers.  Based on a compensation package (direct, substitute 
or deferred pay) and an evaluation of the social and tax yields of each of its components, 
companies may conduct a human resource management and compensation policy compatible 
with their strategic objectives, internal efficiency and competitive performance.  Complementary 
social security may therefore also be a source of competitive advantage.  As with efficiency 
wages, it may be part of a strategic choice made by employers to attract and retain the best 
employees and to encourage efficient work (Weiss, 1980; Stiglitz, 1974).  From this point of 
view, market incentives exist to establish health benefits, in a context in which managing 
productivity is at least as important as minimizing costs.  As a result, it is not sure that the 
dynamics of inter-branch agreements establishing compulsory complementary health coverage 
fit in with companies’ individual strategies for generating competitive advantages, in this case 
via “social” competition in tight labor markets.  Obliging all companies to provide insurance for 
their employees deprives pioneer companies of their relative advantage and obliges them to raise 









































their coverage levels.  This is probably one of the first reasons which explain the clear reticence 
of the social partners to follow up calls by the authorities for complementary insurance and why 
the subject has not been brought back into discussions. 
If on the other hand, complementary insurance (financed by both employees and 
companies) is taken theoretically to be a supply question, then empirical studies still have 
difficulties in proving the returns on these investments for the company.  There is thus no 
evidence that access to health insurance helps diminish absenteeism or employee turnover.  The 
generally accepted assumption that positive spillover effects exist between social benefits and 
productivity does not lead to robust conclusions either.  Consequently, there is still no answer to 
the question as to why companies provide social benefits.  It is doubtless necessary to draw on 
arguments that are not directly utilitarian to explain such behavior.  Social policy within 
companies does not result from ex ante economic calculations, in as far as such policy is 
undertaken subject to cost-benefit analysis of complementary insurance.  Company history, 
culture, the views of top management and the demands of parties involved surely offer better 
explanations.  Furthermore, compensation, its level and distribution are partly determined by 
social norms, while the mechanisms for spreading complementary coverage (in large companies 
at least) are certainly based more on imitation and reputation (so-called organizational 
isomorphism according to Di Maggio and Powell, 1983) than the search for a specific way of 
increasing efficiency.  The present re-positioning of policy on social benefits within the 
framework of raising ”corporate social responsibility” reveals the importance of conformist 
behavior relative to certain rules and practices, when adopted for reasons of efficiency as much 
as legitimacy.  This seems to be the case at least for large companies.  From this perspective, 
complementary health insurance may be viewed more as an extension of old-fashioned 
paternalism, though today companies take on responsibilities voluntarily with respect to society, 
by providing a public good, whereas formerly they were compensating for a deficient state.  But 
conformism does not mean that both companies and employees are constrained to one type of 
behavior.  The implementation of complementary coverage in a company may lead to various 
models.  This is shown when examining the real consequences of incentives to set up 
compulsory schemes for employees.  
Transforming an optional scheme into a compulsory one 
Companies which set up a compulsory health insurance scheme benefiting from socio-
tax breaks face a range of constraints.  The “collective” nature of the scheme must be clearly 
established in order not to favor particular employees, and all must join the scheme (excluding 









































recognized derogations).  Furthermore, employers’ contributions must be “real and uniform”, 
with optional choices being prohibited.  Lastly, contracts must be “responsible”, as discussed 
above.  
Though limited, there is still some scope for decision-making.  First, the optional model 
retains several advantages: the flexibility of implementing an optional contract frees employers 
from the constraint of non-exclusion and can make the optional model appear more respectful of 
employees’ individual/family situations and their preferences.  In particular, the optional model 
limits double insurance phenomena whereby two persons living together are insured twice 
through the company schemes of each partner.  But above all, the compulsory nature of the 
contract leaves questions to be answered in number areas. 
 Which employees are to be covered?  I t  m u s t  b e  r e c a l l e d  that compulsory health 
insurance must cover all staff or an “objective” category: categories legally recognized are 
“employees”, “workers”, “technicians” and “managers”.  Also, all employees (or members of 
objective categories) belonging to a compulsory scheme must receive the same rights.  There 
may not be any discrimination by age, workplace or sex and certainly not by type of contract.    
Does this constraint contradict existing practices?  Not really.  The decision-making rule of 
“choosing a single, general system” to be applied to all employees is already the most 
widespread: in 2003, 83% of those organizations providing health insurance made no distinctions 
among their personnel (Couffinhal and al., 2004).  This may be analyzed as merely meeting cost 
criteria: the larger the group of insured persons, the lower the average contract price.  It may also 
be seen as manifesting a preference for equality of treatment among employees.  In practice 
therefore, compulsory contracts are mainly provided in a single, standard form to all professional 
categories. A widespread notion is that health risks are events over which individuals have 
absolutely no control.  Given this, there is no reason why companies should distinguish between 
employees,: within small groups, equality of treatment may be viewed as a means for 
consolidating cohesion, motivation and confidence (Bewley, 1999).  That said, tensions may 
arise on the one hand between a compulsory insurance model which creates a community with 
coverage or guarantees against risks and on the other hand a simultaneous move to differentiate 
and distinguish employees according to their competencies and via the individualization of 
wages.  In other words, a company seeking to attract and reward specially an employee or 
several employees will not be able to use better forms of health protection in its differentiation 
strategy. Actually, this is still an option, though a company doing so would forfeit tax and social 
security breaks.  The general trend is thus towards non-differentiation, though more detailed 









































study does reveal that when contracts are differentiated by professional category, the best 
guarantees are offered to managers (Francesconi, 2006).  This trend should be reinforced by the 
new contribution and tax rules, which favor higher-paid employees more (as already discussed 
above). 
How are contributions to be distributed?  As with compulsory, public social insurance, 
the finance of complementary health insurance depends on contributions relative to wages, with 
both employers and employees bearing the costs.  Contributions may be proportional to wages 
(capped or calculated according to the gross wage) or they may be flat-rate, perhaps expressed in 
terms of a percentage of a reference value.  Various trade-offs must therefore be made, which 
implicate both the “economic” and “solidarity” aspects of complementary insurance.  For a given 
level of services/benefits, the contribution rate may be lowered, the wider the collection base is.   
The higher the contributions’ ceiling, the more finance is based on full wages and so the less the 
scheme is actuarial which requires contributions to vary according to risk.  A higher ceiling thus 
favors redistribution: in classes of similar risks, raising or removing the contribution ceiling leads 
to vertical solidarity (from higher income earners to lower earners) in financing spending 
(largely) independently of income.  In contrast, the lower the wage contribution ceiling 
(especially if it has been decided to make contributions flat-rate), the more such contributions are 
regressive and proportionately larger for lower income earners.   
What actually occurs?  Generally speaking, complementary company health schemes are 
not very redistributive.  Flat-rate contributions dominate, and when they are proportional, they 
usually have a ceiling: employee contributions which are fully linked to wages are very rare 
(Couffinhal and al., 2004). From this point of view, the new rules do not imply any major, 
direct changes.  The main new features concern the introduction of the notion of a “significant 
contribution” by employers and the impersonal nature of benefits provided.  This implies that 
contributions must be identical, within defined, objective categories.  But they do not have to be 
identical across categories: employers’ contributions may be higher for certain categories, for 
example if a particular professional category is exposed to greater risks because of the work 
involved.  This again, however, is not a break with existing practices, as the financial 
contribution of employers is the same for all employees, averaging about 60% for the 87% of 
organizations providing complementary health insurance (ibid). 
In contrast, the impact may be indirect.  From the point of view of a company which has 
set up a voluntary scheme, the move to a compulsory scheme may significantly increase its 
overall social security contributions.  To be sure, the company needs to take into account the fact 









































that the voluntary scheme would have incurred higher tax and social contributions.  But the extra 
costs of a compulsory scheme may lead it to reconsider all existing choices favoring solidarity.  
The issue of solidarity is most crucial to retired persons, due to new accounting rules.  The 
implementation of new accounting standards obliges companies to include in their liabilities all 
commitments undertaken in terms of pension benefits granted or maintained, subsequent to 
recruitment.  Thus, if a company decides to cover health care for its retired employees, it is tied 
into a life-time commitment, which must be evaluated and entered into the company accounts.  
Such social liabilities are all the more important given demographic aging.  For many companies 
which are overhauling their pension schemes to meet new legal requirements, this raises the 
question of the sustainability of solidarity mechanisms, and often leads to employers 
withdrawing health coverage from former employees.  
Should the “socialized” perimeter be extended or restricted?  To what extent can the 
“responsibility” principle modify trade-offs in companies and lead them to adopt “moderate” 
behavior?  It was shown above that the “responsible” nature of a collective contract has become 
a condition for contributions to receive tax and social security reductions.  There is thus a clearly 
understood interest for contracts to coverage on “responsibility”, with the aim of supporting 
health spending control.  But the manner in which companies commit themselves to 
responsibility may vary, especially as a function of expectations and pressures expressed within 
companies, and the degree to which a company may wish to accommodate individual 
preferences.  The creation of optional arrangements financed only by employees may be a 
solution to these issues, as is borne out by the number of contracts with options provided in 
complementary coverage, especially with private insurance companies.  There is thus a risk that 
a two-tier system may eventually emerge in the company sector, which would be very far from 
concerns for solidarity.  The first tier would follow from companies’ responsibilities for 
providing compulsory complementary coverage.  The second would depend on employees 
themselves, as they buy individual coverage within a collective framework. 
In as much as it organizes a compulsory scheme for its employees and respects the 
conditions required to obtain tax and contribution breaks, a company remains free in terms of the 
financing and content of the coverage it organizes.  Put another way, it is not sure that the 
heterogeneity observed among optional company schemes will diminish significantly with the 
spread of compulsory contracts.  While employees belonging to the same company may have 
more homogenous coverage, great variety in coverage may continue to exist depending on 
company size, or whether the firm is in manufacturing or services.  









































The linkages between schemes and governance 
The public regulator’s interest lies in company insurance being as extensive as possible.  
The invitation to the social partners to negotiate on health insurance at branch level and within 
companies is aimed especially at bringing small- and medium-sized companies “into the game”.  
As has already been shown, this expansion has the capacity to take place within the sign-posted 
domain of industrial relations whose supports (i.e. collective bargaining and the bi-partite 
management of organizations responsible for social protection) are directly engaged by the 
authorities.  The industrial relations system today is, however, experiencing profound change.  
While the tradition of centralized negotiation continues, a new system leaving more scope at 
company level is emerging.  It may be assumed that this shift in the locus of negotiation will not 
be without consequences for complementary insurance coverage and on the contents of 
agreements.  
In as far as the collective, branch agreement, which may impose the insurance provider, 
does not tie the company, the latter is free to chose.  As already stated, the compulsory model 
gives a sort of “premium” to bi-partite institutions which are favored by unions, though the Act 
does require contracts to be put out to tender regularly.  However, the main issue for companies 
lies not so much in the choice of the insurance organization, but rather the latitude they have in 
managing, and more generally in the governance of complementary insurance.  Once again, a 
detailed investigation is required here.  But it does seem that the model of “internal governance” 
in which the company is the key decision-making entity is giving way to a model in which 
intermediaries have a greater role in advice, and more generally in steering and managing 
collective schemes.  Up until recently, decisions concerning complementary health care were a 
“routine” matter, as little was at stake.  Now, the responsibilities given to companies, which 
come at a time when insurance premiums are rising strongly, are leading to significant 
rationalization, whose consequences should not be underestimated.  On the one hand,  drawing 
on the traditional distinction put forward by Walton and McKersie (1965), it can be hypothesized 
that distributive negotiations (with diverging interests and conflict) may become more important 
relative to previous integrative negotiations (cooperative and consensual).  On the other hand, it 
may reasonably be thought that the rationalization process and the search for coverage and 
optimal financing will lead to the greater delegation of strategic decisions to intermediaries.  The 
entry of these new actors will surely alter established negotiation rules and the direct relationship 
between employers and unions is likely to shift to a more technical terrain in which commissions 









































are responsible for managing social security: the latter will still be bi-partite, but will have more a 
role of following up arrangements, influenced by insurance market “experts”. 
Ensuring the effectiveness of lifetime guarantees 
The company-related social protection raises one last question.  This revolves around the 
paradoxical nature of public authorities assigning companies, which are largely subject to the 
uncertainties of a globalized, financial environment, with the task of providing social security 
and hence insurance against risks.  A further paradox stems from trying to provide employees 
with a high level of protection, though their links to companies are unstable.  In other words, it 
may be asked what the effective security of collective coverage is, given business risks on the 
one hand and employment risks on the other.  More precisely, doubts surround the value of 
lifetime guarantees of complementary, collective health insurance contracts, which legislators 
sought to ensure in 1989 by allowing individuals to continue with insurance within tariff 
guidelines, in the face of current trends favoring business flexibility.   The real implementation of 
this right is little documented, except relating to pensions.  In this case, it may be observed that 
the restriction of ex-employees to individual insurance regimes is not a particularly advantageous 
solution, leading to high exit rates (Franc and al., 2007).  Two factors indeed raise the de facto 
cost of coverage for individuals.  First, employers take part less and less (see above) and second, 
contributions in individual insurance contracts are not tax deductible.  Furthermore, though the 
Act does require contracts to include ways for maintaining coverage, it leaves a degree of 
latitude for insurance organizations to define the insurance offered contractually.  This leads the 
ambiguities of the “Evin Act” to emerge.  Coverage of health costs incurred by pensioners, as 
well as those of ex-employees meets a commitment criterion over time.  But this “lifetime” 
coverage is associated with guarantees and contributions which are not constant over time, even 
though they are regulated.  Without going into detail here, it may be noted that the recent 
agreement concerning the modernization of the labor market has introduced the notion of the 
portability of health coverage for the unemployed.  But this in fact only updates a longstanding 
measure which, in practice, has had much difficulty in proving its capacity to “safeguard” the job 
mobility of employees.  Overall, while the regulation of social insurance appears to be oriented 
to the need of lifetime security, the protection actually acquired within companies remains 
strongly limited to labor contracts. 
 
 










































Three main lessons can be drawn from the arguments above.  First, complementary 
coverage is today an indispensable pillar of social insurance, despite the comparatively 
modest financial flows comparatively to compulsory health insurance.  Furthermore, 
complementary coverage is very likely to develop.  Given major social and economic trends 
(demographic aging, slow growth, welfare deficits), the role of the general, public schemes 
can only decline, even if policies to control spending are partly successful and hence give 
these compulsory schemes some budgetary room for maneuver.  However, in a socio-
economic context which is demanding in resources, while pressure on public spending is 
great, the likelihood of a return to strong, consolidated and generous public insurance is very 
small. 
Despite this, the future for health insurance is unclear.  The definition of the new rules 
of the game involve the public authorities in the process of rearranging diverse interests 
within an enlarged governance framework with actors who have not played major roles so far.  
In the past, employer-related health insurance was subject to public regulation occasionally, 
depending mainly on company management, and sometimes even personnel management.  
Today, such insurance occurs within a political and institutional framework, which driving it 
forward, legitimizing and financing it, as well as providing it with enlarged responsibilities.  
Recent regulatory measures are pushing in the same direction: encouraging collective rather 
than individual insurance, compulsory rather than optional schemes, dissuading the selection 
of risks, unifying guarantees within employee categories, favoring negotiation and bi-partite 
management, as well as integrating contractual mechanisms within a set of responsible rules. 
The model preferred by the public authorities is closer to that of public “social 
security” than a “pure insurance” model.  This is the third lesson learnt here.  The incentive 
model is aimed at facilitating the integration of responsible social insurance objectives with 
respect to employees and the community, within company strategies.  Its rapid development 
would be a “win-win” strategy, and the expected results would be visible both economically 
and socially.  Companies’ real interests should lie in implementing, via negotiation, a high 
degree of protection.  Such protection should also be durable, in the face of employment 
changes and should meet employee needs, at a time when rights within the compulsory, 
public system are weakening.  The analysis presented here, however, qualifies these 
arguments. 









































First, at the company level, the advantages of compulsory, complementary insurance 
do not compensate for all the costs.  This is especially so for small- and medium-sized firms.  
Even large companies, when asked, are not without doubts concerning the sustainability of 
the efforts they are required to make, and about the effectiveness of the demands by the public 
authorities.  Contributions by firms have limits, and where these are exceeded, the result may 
be renegotiations on finance with the authorities.  The manner in which complementary health 
care for retirees was recently debated reflects these doubts.  The inter-generational solidarity 
which some company schemes had instituted has been challenged.  Solutions put forward 
today are highly dependent on companies’ capacity to pay.  Schemes based on solidarity may 
be able to continue, but these are compromise solutions whose durability is not guaranteed.  
From this point of view, the futures of the basic and complementary schemes are linked.  
While the regulation of complementary coverage limits the logic of market forces, it does not 
eliminate all its effects, especially concerning inequality of access and coverage.  The 
privileges granted under compulsory contracts do certainly guarantee some scope of solidarity 
for the least fortunate, but such solidarity is fragmented and not collective.  Third, company 
health insurance is far from being generalized.  Nor it is homogenous, in as far as the quality 
of coverage and the sharing-out of contributions between employees and employers depends 
on negotiations, which take place increasingly at company level.  The standardization 
capacity of branch negotiations is diminishing and the governance of complementary 
insurance increasingly involves intermediaries who are market “experts”.  Taken together, 
these comments do not refute the hypothesis that a new “compromise” is emerging, which is 
driven mainly at the microeconomic level, and which will take over from the weakened, 
social, macroeconomic compromise of the Fordist era.  They merely stress the fact that the 
effects generated by the actual role of business involved in efforts to reform health care 
financing are ambiguous.  On the one hand, job-related health insurance is a way of 
combining labor and social insurance, which is at the core of the process of instituting the 
Sécurité sociale.  On the other hand, such protection feeds back into company wage 
strategies.  This “feedback” is very different from the equalitarian and generalized ideal of the 
architects of France’s social health insurance.  
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